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THE TRADITION OF THE WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: A COMMENT ON
PROFESSOR LESSIG'S THEORY OF
TRANSLATION
Steven G. Calabresi*
INTRODUCTION

DROFESSOR Lawrence Lessig has written a series of thought-provoking essays on the process by which judicial readings of the
Constitution change over time.' As he points out, the text of the Constitution has been changed relatively few times through the formal
amendment process of Article V, even though the judicially-discerned
meaning of important constitutional provisions seems radically different in many modem contexts than it did originally. Building on the
notion that "[c]hange is at [the] core [of the Constitution],"'2 Professor
Lessig argues that "many (perhaps most) changed readings are consistent with an account of interpretive fidelity," although he rejects "the
view that changed readings mean that meanings are fluid and fidelity
is bunk."' "What we lack," he argues, "is not the sense that change is
justifiable, but rather any clear sense of just when, or why."4
These, of course, are important questions, and constitutional theorists from Alexander Bickel to Robert Bork to Bruce Ackerman to
Antonin Scalia have provided markedly divergent answers. 5 Professor Lessig's answer is to offer a positive and constructive theory of
constitutional change as a product of fidelity to original principles on
the one hand, combined with translation of those principles to contemporary social contexts on the other. He believes that our constitutional history is best described as a process of translating founding
texts from the deep and rich social background in which they were
produced to new, and often radically different, contemporary social
contexts. Constitutional interpretation is, he argues, the product of
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 Tex. L Rev. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Translation];Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity and
Theory]; Lawrence Lessig, TranslatingFederalisn: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 125 [hereinafter Lessig, Federalism]; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint].
2. Lessig, Fidelity and Theory, supra note 1, at 396.

3. Id
4. Id
5. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991); Alexander Bickel,
The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (1962); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990);
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L Rev. 849 (1989).
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both text and context. Although the text may remain largely the
same, the background uncontested context is always shifting
powerfully. As a result, readings of the Constitution inevitably
change, and hence change is justifiably at the core of the
Constitution.
In responding to this argument, I want both to point out some ways
in which I think Professor Lessig's account fails to describe fully our
actual constitutional practice, and to sketch out a different positive
account that I think is more descriptively complete and accurate. My
goals here are very limited. I seek only to describe our practices; not
to justify or offer prescriptions for the future. Moreover, my description in this brief Response is necessarily only an undefended sketch in
rebuttal of our practices, not a three-volume book series. I leave it to
my readers to intuit for themselves whose story, mine or Professor
Lessig's, rings true.
I.

TiH INCOMPLETENESS OF THE FIDELITY AND TRANSLATION
ACCOUNT

There are at least six key features of the American constitutional
order that are difficult to understand if one relies solely on Professor
Lessig's positive account. While Professor Lessig mentions some of
these phenomena briefly, I do not believe translation theory, as he
describes it, can adequately explain and describe them. The failure of
translation theory to explain and describe these six phenomena, then,
suggests that it fails as a positive account of the American constitutional order.
A.

Translation Theory Cannot Explain Our Constitutional
Tragedies

First, I think translation theory cannot explain the way we think
about what could be called the Supreme Court's constitutional tragedies. These tragedies include such decisions as: Dred Scott v. Sandford;7 The Slaughter-House Cases;' Lochner v. New York;9 Plessy v.
Ferguson;10 Buck v. Bell;" Korematsu v. United States;2 and I would4
add Humphrey's Executor v. United States'3 and Wickard v. Filburn.1
I think translation theory can explain how it is that these tragic cases
6. For a discussion, see Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,supra note 1, at 1367-86;

Lessig, Fidelity and Theory, supra note 1, at 401-07, 410-14.
7. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
8. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
9. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
12. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
13. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
14. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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were decided the way they were decided, but it cannot explain the way
we as a people think about them having happened. I submit that
under our constitutional tradition it has been our practice to think that
all of these cases are tragedies precisely because they were wrongly
decided on the day they were decided for reasons that were clearly
stated either by dissenting justices at the time or by other contemporary constitutional interpreters.
We think these constitutional tragedies are to the Supreme Court
roughly what Watergate is to the presidency. We understand how
Watergate happened in the social context of the times, but we think
that it was an avoidable disaster, something that people should have
been able to appreciate was wrong-was an unfaithful understanding
of presidential power-at the time that it happened. I submit that we
think of the Supreme Court's constitutional tragedies the same way. I
think the general consensus of our tradition has been that in cases like
Dred Scott and Plessy the Supreme Court gave too much weight to the
background social practices of the time and not enough weight to text,
to founding commitments, and to things that have been
constitutionalized.' 5
As a result, we have usually thought that the Supreme Court's constitutional tragedies are "tragic" precisely because result-oriented Justices overly influenced by the social context of their times failed to keep
faith with what founding commitments and constitutional text demanded of them. Impending Civil War and sympathy with slavery
clouded the Court's judgment and legal analysis in Dred Scott; fear of
the unknown and an excessive concern for judicial restraint and federalism led to The Slaughterhouse Cases; racism and the retreat from
Reconstruction led to the failure in Plessy to follow through on the no
caste-based discrimination principle of the Fourteenth Amendment; a
desire to constitutionalize the common law led to the excessively exacting scrutiny of economic regulations in Lochner, a hateful version
of Social Darwinism and eugenics led to the appalling decision in
Buck v. Bell; naivete about the existence of expert nonpartisan regulators led to Humphrey's Executor, the panic of war coupled with racism
led to the tragedy in Korematsu; and the determination to entrench
New Deal nationalism led to the excessive breadth of the opinion in
Wickard v. Filburn.
In each of these cases the background social context triumphed
completely, and constitutional principles were overcome by the passions of the moment. For this reason, originalist judges and scholars
have for years critiqued many of these cases and have offered an explanation for why they were wrongly decided notwithstanding the so-

15. See Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 Const.
Commentary 115 (1994).
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cial contexts in which they arose. 16 I would suggest that Professor
Lessig has offered and can offer no such critique of these constitutional tragedies. His emphasis on social context and background is so
strong and his discussion of founding commitments, constitutionalism,
and text is so brief that he has no vantage point from which to judge
the goodness or badness of the translations in Dred Scott, SlaughterHouse, Plessy, Lochner, Buck v. Bell, Humphrey's Executor, and
Korematsu. Originalism 17 would give him one such vantage point for
criticism; our natural law tradition would give him another. Translation theory, however, leaves him with worse than nothing to say. It
leaves him explaining and justifying bad decisions which some saw as
bad when they were rendered and which our constitutional tradition
has denounced.
My first critique of translation theory then is that by emphasizing
social context and background so heavily it has the potential to justify
everything the Supreme Court does or has ever done simply because
the Supreme Court has done it.'" Such an outcome would leave us
with the ultimate positive theory, but with no means to criticize anything the Supreme Court ever does.
B.

Translation Theory Cannot Explain Our Constitutional
Restorations

A second problem with Professor Lessig's translation theory is that
it incompletely describes certain positive phenomena in our constitutional tradition. Aside from our belief that we have lived through certain great constitutional tragedies, another feature of our
constitutional tradition is that we also believe we have lived through
certain great constitutional "restorations" as well. These restorations
could be described as being fundamentalist epiphanies (experienced
by the Supreme Court) that some founding value or textual provision
is not being adequately taken into account by the current legal
culture.
16. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 5, at 28-34, 44-46 (critiquing Dred Scott and Lochner); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752 (1995) (critiquing Wickard v.
Filburn) [hereinafter, Calabresi, Limited and Enumerated Powers]; Steven G. Cala-

bresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale
L.J. 541 (1994) (critiquing the theory of Humphrey's Executor); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privilegesor Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385 (1992) (critiquing
the Slaughter-House Cases); Michael W. McConnell, The OriginalistJustification for
Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1937 (1995) (advancing
originalist arguments against the construction of the 14th amendment adopted in
Plessy).

17. I count Bruce Ackerman on my side here. His theory of three originalisms
offers such a vantage point as well.
18. This of course is the opposite error of the one some originalists are accused of
committing, which is of having an idealized theory of constitutional interpretation
that bears no relationship to what the Supreme Court actually does and has done.
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Professor Lessig discusses and explains several of these fundamentalist epiphanies-the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins 19 and its New Deal era caselaw, for example-and I
agree with much of what he says about those episodes but there are
many, many other episodes which he does not discuss and which I
doubt translation theory can explain. The appearance of the incorporation doctrine many decades after the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified; the extirpation of racial discrimination beginning with Brown
v. Board of Education;2 the revival of separation of powers beginning
with Buckley v. Valeo 2 ' in 1976, and INS v. Chadha z and continuing
through the decision in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm;23 the revival of federalism beginning with National League of Cities v. Usery' in 1976
and continuing through the recent decisions in United States v. Lo2 6 the abolition and subsequent
pez5 and Seminole Tribe v. Florida;
reinstatement of the death penalty; the rise and fall of the Warren
Court's libertarian criminal procedure caselaw; the recognition that
the Constitution imposes limits on libel suits in New York Times v.
Sullivan27 and on punitive damages in BMW v. Gore;'2 the revival of
the Free Exercise Clause in Sherbert v. Verner29 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder,30 and the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect against
regulatory takings in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,3 1 Lu33
cas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council,32 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.
Professor Lessig's argument is that changes of this kind occur because of changes in social context, especially the uncontested background social context. Thus, Erie is explained by the shift to
positivism and realism in our understanding of common law decisionmaking; the New Deal is the natural result of the growth of a vast
national economy coupled with the arbitrary and political nature of
the doctrines the old Court made up to protect a sphere of state
power; the questioning of independent agencies in the 1980s is the
natural result of the growth of public choice criticisms of the ossibility of expert, disinterested public administration; and Chevron defer19. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

462
115
426
115
116
376

U.S. 919 (1983).
S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
U.S. 833 (1976).
S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
U.S. 254 (1964).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).

28. 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996).

34. The term comes from Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council,

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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ence is the result of our appreciation of the political nature of legal
interpretation under broad post-New Deal statutory delegations of
power.
I do not disagree with any of these observations; indeed, as Professor Lessig acknowledges they are so obviously true that they are practically part of the received wisdom of our scholarly canon. I do not
agree, however, that changing social context and uncontested background by themselves account entirely for either the decisions Professor Lessig discusses or for the other positive originalist epiphanies I
listed above. To begin with, the background assumptions of our legal
culture are powerfully shaped in my opinion by our reverence for the
"sacred" texts of the American constitutional tradition. The Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Civil War Amendments are great pillars of our culture. They are to our imagination what the dome of the
Capitol Building, the White House, the Supreme Court, and the chiseled faces on Mount Rushmore are to television newscasters. They
are the foundation stones of the Republic, cultural icons of the greatest importance. Their meaning is illuminated by other powerful texts
of varying degrees of significance: the Declaration of Independence;
the FederalistPapers; Washington's Farewell Address; the writings of
Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln. All of these foundational
texts (the "Founding Texts") shaped, and continue to shape, our constitutional culture every day. They cut like a powerful spotlight
through the foggy opinions of the Supreme Court and through the
corrupt practices and customs that sometimes threaten to encrust our
ancient liberties. They stand for the values of progress, the Enlightenment, liberty, reason, individualism, limited government, and the continuing war against feudal ideas of caste.
In my opinion, these great texts exercise a permanently destabilizing influence on our social and legal life.35 Contexts may change,
new technologies may develop, ideas about the nature of law, caste,
and of government may shift, but the constitutionalized ideals of the
Founding Era are always pulling like a powerful rip tide in certain
predictable directions.36 Put another way, uncontested background
35. Consider here, my colleague Tom Merrill's argument that textual originalism is
very unsettling to conventional ways of doing things. See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v.
Burke, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Po'y 509, 523 (1996). Merrill argues that:
Borkean originalism [is] not very conservative at all. It is more akin to the
radical philosophy of the Seventeenth Century puritan revolutionaries who
argued for throwing off the "Norman Yoke" by returning to the purity of the
original Anglo-Saxon Constitution. [citing Christopher Hill, Puritanism and
Revolution 50-122 (1958)]. Like other forms of radicalism, originalism is no
doubt far more exciting than conventionalism. But then if you are a true
conservative, revolutionary excitement should not be the summum bonum.
IL; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalismas Transformative Politics, 63 Tulane L.
Rev. 1599 (1989) (making a similar argument).
36. I include Abraham Lincoln among the Founders here because of the role his
ideas played in giving rise to the critically important post-Civil War amendments.
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social contexts are constantly being shaped and transformed by a legal
culture that has at its heart and soul transformative texts that we all
recognize as being fundamental, and to which we all can repair for
sustenance when things seem to be going wrong.37
The transformative destabilizing nature of these texts is evident
throughout our constitutional history. The ringing words of the Declaration of Independence and the post Civil War Commitment to a nocaste society have helped destabilize slavery, Jim Crow laws, Social
Darwinism and eugenics, and discrimination against women and religious and ethnic minorities. The commitment to government by the
consent of the governed in the Declaration and in the Constitution has
encouraged a two century long global revolution in the forms of
human governance.
The commitment to limited government through federalism, separation of powers, and a Bill of Rights has likewise been transformative.
From 1976 through 1996 there has been a steady revival of the values
of federalism and of separation of powers in the opinions of the
Supreme Court. This revival represents a partial rejection, frankly, of
the constitutionalism of the New Deal era. It is occurring, in my opinion, in part because of the inconsistency of aspects of the New Deal
with the Founding Texts. Similarly, an aura of fundamentalist
reawakening and revival overlay the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights and such decisions as New York Times v. Sullivan, Sherbert v.
Verner, Wisconsin v. Yoder, and the recent cases on regulatory takings
and punitive damages which have revived principles of economic liberty that have long been dormant. There is no mystery about where
cases like Brown v. Board of Education or the incorporation cases, or
INS v. Chadha or United States v. Lopez or Nollan v. California
CoastalCommission came from. They all reflect the continuing power
of our "sacred" Founding Texts to shape and mold the uncontested
background legal culture at all times.
This is not to deny Professor Lessig's points about how changing
technology and ideas about law can result in the same texts being applied in different ways at different times. I do, however, deny that
changes in background social context and translation are very important compared to the fidelity side of the equation which Lessig leaves
largely undiscussed. The Founding Texts and their cultural influence
are more permanent than the shifting social ideas that Professor Lessig mentions about the nature of law and about caste and the implications of new technologies. Those texts represent really big ideas in the
march of human history for which millions of people have gone to war
and died, and to which the nation is literally dedicated. Debates
about the nature of the common law, or gay rights, or the implications
for the Bill of Rights of wiretap technology, and the development of
37. See Solum, supra note 35.

1442

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

television simply cannot compare to the principles of Democracy,
Freedom, Individual Rights, and Limited Government over which we
fought the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, World War II, or the
Cold War. The Founding Texts quite simply tower in importance over
the shifts in social context that have occurred over the last 200 years.
Clearly, Americans revere the Constitution to the point of mistakenly thinking that it is perfect.38 One consequence of this is that our
constitutional texts have a constant transformative effect on social
background assumptions of the kind that Professor Lessig discusses.
The great texts of our constitutional tradition are always calling us
back to the Founding values of individual freedom, economic liberty,
the separation of powers, and federalism. Thus, I think that it is the
writteness of our constitution 39 -the text-that explains most of the
constitutional epiphanies in our constitutional tradition and not shifting background assumptions and social contexts. I think our tradition
is essentially anti-Burkean and anti-corrupt practices. There is a fundamentalist, protestant textualist strain to our constitutional tradition
which seeks constantly to strip away corrupt interpretations as part of
a never-ending quest for social renewal.
C.

Translation Theory Cannot Explain Our Changing Conceptions
of the JudicialRole

A third difficulty with translation theory is that it relies heavily on
something that Professor Lessig describes as the Frankfurter Constraint on the judicial role. Professor Lessig argues that this constraint
works differently in structural constitutional cases than it does in individual rights constitutional cases. With respect to the former, Professor Lessig argues that the Frankfurter Constraint counsels judicial
deference and restraint once something becomes contested due to
shifting social background assumptions. In individual rights cases,
however, Professor Lessig shifts his ground. Here he contends that an
active judicial role is called for once individual rights become contested due to shifting social background assumptions. Professor Lessig does not argue normatively for this differential application of the
Frankfurter Constraint.4" Rather, he seems to believe that such a differential application is a permanent and positive feature of our constitutional tradition.
38. See Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981).
39. For a discussion of the importance of the writtenness of our Constitution, see
Henry Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev.
723 (1988).

40. For a defense of the proposition that federal courts should be active in enforcing individual rights guarantees, but passive with respect to most structural constitutional clauses, see Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process
(1980).
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I have several criticisms of Professor Lessig's positive account on
these matters. First, the ideas about judicial role implicit in the notion
of the Frankfurter Constraint are themselves evidence of the power of
the constitutional text in shaping the way we think about the federal
courts. This constraint, which assuredly exists and binds all our courts,
is itself the product of a legal culture shaped for 200 years by a document that distinguishes between judicial, executive, and legislative
power, and that reserves policy choices to democratically accountable
actors. There is no mystery about where the Frankfurter Constraint
comes from. It comes from the text of our Constitution which gives
the federal courts "judicial power," and not the power either to sit as a
Council of Revision or to render advisory opinions.
Second, and more importantly, I think it is indisputably true that
Professor Lessig's account notwithstanding, the Frankfurter Constraint has clearly operated very differently in structural and in individual rights cases at different points in our history. Prior to 1937, the
Supreme Court was quite active in structural constitutional cases and
in defending property rights, and it was quite passive in enforcing the
civil rights aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Privileges or
Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause were treated almost as though they addressed nonjusticiable political questions, while
the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clauses were the subjects
of an extensive body of caselaw.
After 1937, however, the opposite situation prevailed. Structural
constitutional provisions and economic rights became judicially unenforceable and individual liberty provisions bearing on civil rights became almost the exclusive concern of the federal courts. By 1980,
Jesse Choper was able to write a widely cited and much discussed
book that accurately described the prevailing positive account of the
judicial role between roughly 1937 and 1976.11 Choper's book received much attention because it described a positive set of understandings about the judicial role that had reigned for nearly forty
years.
Beginning in 1976, however, the first signs were becoming quite evident that a modest movement was underway to push our conception
of the judicial role back in the pre-1937 direction. Today's Supreme
Court is clearly more active in federalism, separation of powers, and
economic liberty cases than were the Supreme Courts that sat between 1937 and 1976. Decisions such as National League of Cities v.
Usery, United States v. Lopez, Seminole Tribe, Buckley v. Valeo, INS v.
Chadha,Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission, 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,"2 and BMW v. Gore all herald the end of the New Deal conception of the judicial role and the
41. See id
42. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
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reemergence of a modest degree of judicial enforcement of structural
and economic constitutional rights. At the same time, the period between 1976 and the present has seen the reemergence of judicial restraint in the area of individual civil rights. Decisions such as
Washington v. Davis4 3 and Bowers v. Hardwick," coupled with the
restoration of the death penalty and the cutting back of the Warren
Court's criminal procedure caselaw, all suggest a slowing (perhaps
temporary) of the Court's activism in the individual civil rights area.
The point of all of this is that I doubt our practice is clear enough to
support Professor Lessig's generalizations about the judicial role and
when we do or do not invoke the Frankfurter Constraint in structural
and individual rights cases. Aside from the three different eras with
differing conceptions of the judicial role that I have mentioned, there
are no doubt other eras as well. There is simply no uniform conception of the judicial role throughout American history that would support Professor Lessig's positive account on this matter. Every age
apparently has its own conception of whether judges should be active
in structural or economic or civil rights cases.
Third, Professor Lessig's account here is suspect because it presupposes a sharper distinction than actually exists between individual civil
rights cases and structural cases in the federalism and separation of
powers areas. The difference between these two categories of cases is
not at all clear to me. Why is it that Romer v. Evans 5 and Planned
Parenthoodof Pennsylvaniav. Casey46 are individual civil rights cases,
as Professor Lessig claims, and not federalism cases as I have claimed
in some of my prior writings? 47 On the other hand, why are the federalism issues in Lopez and in Erie not also individual rights issues, at
least as far as individuals like Mr. Lopez are concerned? I frankly do
not believe that any very clear line exists that really helps to explain
why the Supreme Court (or those who comment on the Court) choose
to characterize some of these cases as being federalism or separation
of powers cases while others are characterized as being individual civil
rights cases. The decision to characterize Lopez as a federalism case
and Casey as an individual rights case seems to me to be completely
an arbitrary one. Both cases obviously involve issues of both federalism and of individual rights.
Finally, Professor Lessig advances the positive claim that the Frankfurter Constraint is never invoked in individual rights cases in our
political tradition once something becomes contested. Thus, he ar43. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
44. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).

45. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
46. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
47. See, e.g., Steven Calabresi, Out of Order: Clinton's Court and Its Assault on

Justice, Pol'y Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 14; Calabresi, Limited and EnumeratedPowers,
supra note 16.
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gues that judicial restraint in cases like Romer is no longer possible in
our constitutional tradition once it becomes contested whether homosexuality is or is not a psychological or biological disorder. This claim
seems to me not to be accurate. We certainly do not privilege individual claims of right under the Eight Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishment clause, even though the constitutionality of the death penalty is contested in American society. Similarly, our courts have in
recent years practiced restraint in criminal procedure cases, and they
have been reluctant to expand new theories of legal liability in discrimination cases absent evidence of invidious intent. It is simply not
true that there exists a settled consensus that we should never invoke
the Frankfurter Constraint in individual rights cases. Major figures in
our recent constitutional history have devoted their whole careers to
arguing that it is in precisely this area that judicial restraint is most
needed. Justices Scalia and Thomas, Presidents Reagan and Bush,
Judge Bork in his nationally televised confirmation hearings, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist for the last twenty-five years have all argued
vigorously against the proposition that Professor Lessig assumes is uncontested and uncontestable.
It is quite clear as a positive descriptive matter that no settled consensus exists in this country with respect to the judicial role in individual rights cases.
D. Translation Theory Departs Radically from the Traditional Way
in Which We Characterizethe Process of Fidelity and
Change
A fourth way in which translation theory fails to account positively
for our constitutional traditions stems from the implications of the
new language it uses to describe an ancient and long recognized phenomenon. I frankly find it a bit surprising for a positive account of
our constitutional practices to depart from the traditional way of characterizing the process of fidelity and change which Professor Lessig is
talking about. The traditional characterization has been one that emphasizes a dichotomy between, on the one hand, the text of the Constitution as originally understood and, on the other hand, the need to
apply that text to changing social circumstances. This is the characterization of which Judge Bork speaks in The Tempting of America48
when he is discussing his famous concurrence in Ollman v. Evans &
Novak.49 Professor Lessig, however, chooses to substitute for the
traditional dichotomy a wholly new dichotomy between, on the one
hand, fidelity to founding commitments, and on the other hand, translation of those commitments into the world in which we live.
48. See Bork, supra note 5, at 167-69.
49. 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985).
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Professor Lessig's decision to change the phrase "text and application" to the phrase "founding commitments and translation" seems to
me to be unhelpful in an essay that purports only to offer us a positive
account of our constitutional traditions. "Founding commitments" are
never described at any length in Professor Lessig's article, but the
phrase connotes for me a watered down, abstract version of the constitutional text as it was originally understood. The substitution of the
phrase "translation" on the other hand for the traditional phrase "application" is clearly meant to connote something aggressive-a thorough reshaping if you will of the original with the suggestion that
inevitably something of the original text will be lost in translation, and
that multiple translations must compete necessarily with one another
before we can know either which one is the best or more simply which
one we like the most.
I think the substitution of founding commitments/translation for
text/application is inconsistent with what I would call a deep-seated
cultural commitment to written constitutionalism in this country, and
thus is regrettable in any positive account of our constitutional traditions. For more than 200 years, we Americans have endorsed written
constitutionalism as: (1) a mechanism for solving intergenerational
collective action problems, (2) as a vehicle in important constitutional
moments for entrenching fundamental rights, (3) as a way of removing
by gag rule contentious issues of religion and race from the agenda of
ordinary politics, and (4) as a way of structuring permanently our
political institutions. Moreover, our devotion to constitutionalism has
always emphasized the writtenness of our admittedly epigrammatic
and short Constitution. Our civic culture emphasizes the fact that we,
unlike the British, have a written Constitution, and it is on this aspect
of our Constitution that Chief Justice Marshall founded the institution
of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison. 0 For more than 200 years,
it has always been the case that ordinary educated Americans would
answer the question "What is the Constitution of your country?" by
pointing to a certain text that begins with the words "We the People."
Now, suddenly, 209 years after the Philadelphia Convention a positive account of our constitutional practices is offered that nowhere
mentions the text of the Constitution of 1787 and that refers instead to
the far more abstract notion of fidelity to "Founding Commitments."
This I submit is a mistake. The true positive account is that for more
than 200 years we Americans have taken our cue from Article VI and
sworn our oaths of allegiance (or made our affirmations) to "support
this Constitution."' 5 1 Our fidelity is to the written Constitution of
1787, as amended-nothing more and nothing less. This traditional
way of describing what we are faithful to emphasizes our deepseated
50. 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see Monaghan, supra note 38.
51. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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200 year old cultural commitment both to constitutionalism and to the
written document that emerged from Philadelphia in 1787. If we have
a constitutional tradition in this country, it is one that emphasizes the
writteness of our Constitution. We are not England-thank God!
I also disagree with the second half of Professor Lessig's new formulation: his substitution of the word "translation" for the word "application." Our world is not so different or distant from the world of
the Founders that "translation" is needed. Our Constitution is written
in English and was ratified by people who read Aristotle and Plato;
Shakespeare and Milton; Aquinas and Augustine; Hobbes and Hume;
Locke and Monstesquieu; Voltaire and Rousseau; Jefferson and
Madison; the Old and New Testaments of the Bible; Dante and Homer. Americans think the 200 years from the Republic of Slavery to
the Democracy of today is an eon. It is not. Most Europeans think of
the last 200 years as representing a short period of time. They know
more than we do in this respect. Most of the changes that have occurred in the last 200 years (the abolition of slavery and of caste) have
occurred because of our great Founding Texts not despite them.
The American legal tradition is just not that old nor can the Constitution be fairly compared to some ancient manuscript written in
Greek or Sanskrit. The Founding Texts range in age from 220 to 130
years old. They are all written in a language which is with minimal
exceptions the same language that we speak today. The people who
produced them read the same Bible most of us read, were influenced
by almost all of the same philosophers and writers, and were committed to the Enlightenment values of science, reason, and progress.
While important changes have occurred (mostly as a result of the
Founding Texts and not despite them), nothing has happened that requires something as wrenching as a translation. Application to changing circumstances-sure. Everyone agrees with that. But, application
is not translation, and to equate our practice of application with translations is both to misstate what we do and to marginalize the importance of the Founding Texts relative to the changing modem contexts
in which they are being applied. I reject the translation metaphor
which conjures up images of literary interpretation where multiple
readings may be appropriate and desirable, and where what the text
means to the reader is more important than the social meaning it has
had over time. Legal texts, unlike poems, are enforced with bullets
and guns. This is why creative readings of the tax code are not received as enthusiastically in our society as are new translations of
Homer.
The main differences between the world of today and the world of
1787 are the direct result of the Enlightenment commitments of the
Framers which have made our world a far better place in which to live
than was their own. The Founding commitments to liberty and equality and democracy have produced unprecedented improvements in the
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lives of all, and especially in the lives of African-Americans and women. In all other respects, however, our knowledge of philosophy,
religion, ethics, political economy, and literature have not expanded
as much as we sometimes like to think. Nor, in my opinion, has
human nature changed appreciably over the last two centuries as best
as we can tell.
There is simply no case then to be made for "translation" as opposed to "application." We are still the same people, the same political community, as the one that ratified the Constitution. The
American public of today knows this even if their humble servants in
the legal academy do not. That is why they so readily accepted the
ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution,
even though the ratification process was dragged out over a period of
200 years! The constitutional significance of the public's ready acceptance of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is that it indicates that on
May 7, 1992, We thought We were still the same People, the same
political community, as the one that ratified that document that
emerged from Philadelphia in 1787.
E. Translation Theory Is Unnecessary to Explain the Changes
Professor Lessig Seeks to Explain
Fifth, translation theory fails the test of Ockham's razor because it
is not necessary to explain the changes that Professor Lessig seeks to
explain. Contrary to the account that is offered in Professor Lessig's
principal paper, all originalists agree that application of the text to
changing circumstances in many of the instances he describes is quite
unremarkable. Thus, Judge Bork and Justice Scalia have no difficulty
applying the First Amendment to regulation of broadcasting or of
cable television. Similarly, no originalist I know is the least bit concerned about the need to apply the Fourth Amendment to electronic
wiretaps. Absolutely no one thinks that the fact that the Air Force
was called the Air Force, instead of the Aerial Navy, means that it is
not encompassed within the grant of power to Congress to set up an
Army and a Navy.5 2 And, even moving beyond these most straight52. Similarly, Erie is quite explainable on originalist grounds even leaving aside
the shift in ideas about legal positivism and the nature of the common law which
Lessig identifies. Many developments came together to delegitimize the regime of
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), and produce Erie. First, by the time Erie was decided
a vibrant national commercial economy was firmly in place. This new fact undercut
any social need that might once have existed for a unified federal common law and
delegitimized Swift. Second, the rule of Swift had led to forum shopping and had thus
proved to have administrability costs that Justice Story could not have originally appreciated. Third, Erie was decided in the wake of decades of federal judicial activism
on economic matters mostly at the expense of state governments. For originalists, this
activism raised both separation of powers and federalism problems of great magnitude. A rule of restraint like the one announced in Erie was plainly faithful to Founding ideas about the separation of powers and federalism, especially since by the 1930s
a national commercial economy had been achieved. Finally, as Professor Stephen
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forward of examples, Judge Bork has argued that the process of applying an unchanging text justifies the rule against libel suits announced
in New York Times v. Sullivan. In a passage that Professor Lessig
quotes and approves, Judge Bork explains that changing circumstances with respect to the impact of libel litigation on First Amendment values justifies a new rule as the text of that Amendment is
applied to an ever-changing world. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia seem also to endorse new applications of old constitutional
principles. Both Justices have accepted the partial application of the
no caste-based discrimination principle of the Fourteenth Amendment
to gender classifications, even though the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment almost certainly did not understand the Amendment to
have that application.53
Gardbaum has pointed out to me, the new rule in Erie coupled with revisions in preemption doctrine helped to give at least some power back to the states at a time when
the Court was abandoning efforts to police the perimeters of Congress's enumerated
powers under Article I, Section 8.
53. Similarly, some, though not all, of the New Deal expansion of federal power is
explainable by reference to the constitutional text. Frst, as Professor Lessig and
thousands of others have noted, technological change and population growth had by
the 1930s created a national economy with far vaster movement of goods and people
across state lines than previously existed. This necessarily increased the scope of Congress's power and reduced the domain of state power. Second, and very importantly,
the number of states had expanded from thirteen at the time of the Founding to fortyeight by the time of the New Deal. This simple development was of great legal and
political consequence because it greatly increased the likelihood that any commercial
activity would at some point involve a state line crossing, especially given the technological and population changes mentioned above. At the same time, state laws in
areas of traditional state power were more likely to cause external effects on other
states simply because by 1937 one had to contend with forty-eight actors generating
external effects whereas in 1789 you had only to contend with thirteen. To the extent
that severe external effects were likely to substantially affect the flow of commerce
and assuming, as I think is correct, that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to regulate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce then it follows
that the expansion in the number of states would necessarily lead to an expansion in
congressional power.
For reasons I have explained elsewhere, these considerations I think explain the
decision in Darby v. United States, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and help to explain the constitutionality of many of the New Deal programs. Excesses certainly occurred, in part
as a reaction to the excesses of judicial activism of the old Court. Some opinions like
Humphrey's Executor, Wickard v. Flburn,and Blaisdell were certainly written in ways
that cannot be explained or justified on textualist/originalist grounds. Interestingly, it
is these decisions and not Darby that have come under subsequent and recent criticism from both the Supreme Court and from legal academics.
But, it is also important to remember what did not happen during the New Deal
era: no new fundamental transformative text was generated comparable to the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution or the Civil War Amendments. No economic Bill of Rights was adopted, no constitutionalizing of the welfare state occurred,
no repeal of the Madisonian Constitution of checks and balances was proposed, no
repeal of the Takings or Contracts Clauses was effected, no national code of Private
Law was adopted nor were any national rules on corporate chartering proposed. In
short, no entrenching and transformative text/law was produced. as a result, we see
today the quiet repeal by a Democratic President of one of the very cornerstones of
FDR's New Deal, the federal guarantee of a welfare entitlement even as the Supreme
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What then is the difference, if there is any between translation theory, on the one hand, and what could be called moderate originalism
on the other-a moderate originalism that all agree accommodates at
least some new applications of text in light of changing social circumstances? The big disagreement, it seems to me, comes over whether it
is legitimate for the Supreme Court to drive the background evolution
in social values and mores or whether the Court is merely authorized
to discern such changes after they have already happened and only
then allow those changes to reflect themselves in doctrine and
caselaw. The dichotomy is between a Supreme Court that is an agent
of social change and a Supreme Court that takes account of social
changes only after they have already occurred. On this question moderate originalists like Bork, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas are pretty
clearly of the view that the Court should not drive the processes of
social change. Translation theorists like Professor Lessig seem to be
on the other side, however, at least judging by the enthusiasm with
which Professor Lessig greets the Court's social engineering in Romer
and in United States v. Virginia,54 the Court's recent Virginia Military
Institute gender discrimination decision.
It is extremely difficult for me to understand how Translation Theory, a theory that emphasizes the importance of social background
and context, could tell us much about, or justify, the legitimacy of the
Supreme Court driving the processes of social change rather than discerning them. That social changes occur and become reflected in judicial doctrine is undeniably true. That the Supreme Court has a
warrant to cause this process to happen at an accelerated pace is far
from obvious, however. Indeed, the finest conservative legal minds on
the bench all deny heatedly and rightly in my view that the Court has
any such authority. Alexander Bickel once proposed that the
Supreme Court should be governed by the idea of progress-that it
should try always to move us toward a more perfect future. But, as
John Hart Ely responded it is as tyrannical for present majorities to be
governed by the future as it would be for them to be governed by the
past.55 Even if the Court could accurately discern the future, and
there is no particular reason why we should obviously assume that to
be the case, it is wrong for the Court to cram down on Americans
today the values of their children and grandchildren.
Finally, a positive account of the processes of doctrinal change has
to be able to account for all of the Supreme Court's retreats on these
matters. In recent years, the Court has come close to abolishing capiCourt continues to develop a twenty year revival of the judicial enforcement of the
separation of powers and federalism.
54. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
55. See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review 70 (1980) (discussing how our constitutional structure prevents tyranny of the
majority).
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tal punishment and then backed away; it announced a criminal procedure revolution and then backed away; it began an unenumerated
individual rights revolution and then partially backed away in Bowers
v. Hardwick and to some degree even in Casey. Translation theory
does not seem to describe very well this process of doctrinal backing
and filling. Perhaps, it can be better explained by the observation that
the American people get mad when they sense the Supreme Court has
gotten into the social change business, and they usually respond by
forcing the Justices, to some degree or another, to back down.
F. Translation Theory Cannot Explain the Timing of Changed
Readings
My sixth and final critique of translation theory is one that Professor Lessig anticipates to some degree but fails adequately to respond
to, in my judgment. I believe Translation Theory fails as a positive
account of the processes of doctrinal change because the changes in
social context that Professor Lessig discusses cannot explain the timing
of the changes in Supreme Court doctrine that he seeks to justify. The
changes in the understanding of law that underlie Erie or Chevron
happened over many years. So too did the growth of the national
economy and the expansion in the number of states which was important to the changes in constitutional doctrine during the New Deal. If
that is the case, why does translation take so long to happen? If the
meaning of the Constitution really results from the courts reading a
text in a new context and translating it, then why do old readings persist for so long after the context has changed? Why did we have to
wait so long for Erie or Darby or Brown or Lopez? Why did the
Court expand the rights of criminal defendants in the Warren Court
era, and retract them somewhat after 1968? Why has the last twenty
years seen a modest revival of federalism, the separation of powers,
and of judicially enforced economic liberties, while the years between
1937 and 1976 were a time of unbridled nationalism?
I think the answer to this question is complex, and I will present the
balance of my views below, but for now suffice it to say that I do not
agree that translation occurs or that the meaning of the Constitution
literally changes when the courts apply it differently in an everchanging world. Nor do I think that the courts are the final interpreters of the Constitution and therefore the arbiters of its ultimate
meaning. We the People perform that function over a period of many
decades through our agents: the President, the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and the institutions of our state governments. Periodically, acting through a kind of electoral college, we elect Supreme
Court Justices and other federal judges to speak for a while in our
name. If they speak wrongly (and they almost always do to some extent-just as our presidents and congressmen do) we either ignore
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what they say or we gradually replace them with a new set of spokesmen who will more accurately apply the great texts.
The core meaning of the fundamental texts is quite stable in my
view although knotty questions of application are always arising, particularly under the Fourteenth Amendment. On all the really fundamental matters, the political institutions of government hum along
without any need for constitutional interpretation. Elections are held
when they are supposed to be held, presidents and congresses come
and go, California and Wyoming send two representatives to the Senate, constitutional amendments are proposed and are almost always
defeated, very few important laws get enacted, and the national defense and currency are maintained.
Every once in a while, the Supreme Court gets seriously out of line
with the prevailing popular understandings of the great texts in our
constitutional tradition. More often the Court just gets somewhat out
of line: too solicitous of the rights of criminal defendants or too nationalist or not nationalist enough or too libertarian or too statist.
When that happens the presidential/senatorial "Electoral College"
gradually brings the Court back into line. Sometimes that process of
correction happens suddenly as with the Legal Tender cases or with
the Revolution of 1937 or with Brown. And sometimes it happens
more gradually as with the slow growth of the Incorporation Doctrine
or the slow undermining of the Warren Court's criminal procedure
caselaw or the gradual restoration of the separation of powers and of
federalism and of economic liberty.
The process is necessarily an ongoing one because changing social
contexts (disputed and undisputed) are only a very small part of the
picture. Much depends on judicial retirement patterns, the extent to
which individual presidents and senators choose to focus on judicial
selection over other issues that may be competing for their time, the
accuracy of their guesses about what nominees will do, and the bundling of different interpretations of different clauses that potential judicial nominees happen to offer. The final picture is substantially the
one that Professor Robert Dahl drew almost forty years ago of a
Supreme Court that basically enacts the constitutional interpretations
of the majority coalition in the White House and in the Senate that
functioned as its "Electoral College." 56 Enduring cohesive electoral
coalitions have a big impact on the federal judiciary and on constitutional interpretation; transient and fickle coalitions produce slow
change or no change at all. Few victories achieved this way are per56. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, JudicialIndependence and the Reality of Political
Power, 54 Pol'y Rev. 369 (1992); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Courtas a NationalPolicy-Maker,6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957); see also Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?

(1991).
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manent and few defeats are lasting, if those defeated can figure out
how to mobilize the public against the Court.
The federal courts at the end of the day are primarily constitutional
agenda setters, with a fairly limited power to resist a mobilized public
opinion for long periods of time. This does not mean that the federal
courts are politically unimportant. To the contrary, agenda setting
and issue framing is critically important in any democratic or
majoritarian decision-making process as those familiar with the modem literature on public choice theory and voting paradoxes well
know.
Moreover, it is also significant that under Dahl's positive account of
the processes of constitutional change the Supreme Court imposes the
values of a nationalmajority coalition. Sometimes such national coalitions use the Supreme Court to coerce very large numbers of dissenting states and even regions who do not share their values and
constitutional understandings. Because the policy-making procedure
of the Supreme Court does not protect state power by including such
impediments to national action as bicameralism, presentment, filibusters, and the periodic need to stand for re-election, it has in recent
years been used with brutal effectiveness on those southern and western states that adhere to traditional moral values scorned by the more
secular and less traditional voters of California and the Northeast.
These voters have narrowly succeeded in electing a six justice majority
of the current court that is willing to impose socially liberal elite values on substantial portions of the country that would prefer to follow
more traditional social rules.
At the end of the day, however, it must be conceded that Professor
Dahl's positive account is largely an accurate one. Democratic control
of the Senate from 1986 to 1994 coupled with Democratic control of
the White House from the 1992 presidential election to the present
has led to the appointment of four socially liberal Justices (Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) coupled with one socially conservative
Justice (Thomas). Adding these Justices together with their predecessors has produced a socially liberal court. Thus, it is Professor Dali
and not Professor Lessig who offers us the real positive account of the
causes of doctrinal change. Dahl's theory can explain the timing and
the degree of the changes we all observe in Supreme Court doctrine in
a way that Professor Lessig's theory cannot.
II. CONSTITUTIONALISM, FIDELITY, AND ORIGINALISM
Now, it would be possible to conclude from the argument with
which I ended the previous section that constitutionalism, fidelity, and
certainly originalism are completely dead. Some might interpret the
positive account I sketched out above as suggesting that, in practice,
constitutional law and doctrine is all just politics. I emphatically
disagree.
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In my view, what Professor Dahl's positive account really tells us is
something that we all basically know. Our Constitution is ultimately
enforced by the people of the United States, acting through their
elected representatives, and not by the Justices of the Supreme Court.
Our Supreme Court acts ultimately, as the people's agent, and when it
does so it ultimately reflects the way We the People, who indirectly
elected those Justices, think about constitutional issues. Thus, I think
that our practice and history suggests it is the American people's understanding of the nature and meaning of our Constitution that ultimately matters and not the understanding of the Justices of the
Supreme Court.
What this means is that anyone who wants to offer a positive account of the evolving meaning of our Constitution should ask themselves what do the people think the Constitution has come to mean,
not what do the Justices of the Supreme Court think it means as is
evidenced by their caselaw. If the people enforce the Constitution at
the end of the day it is their understanding of its meaning that counts
and not the Court's understanding.
So what do the American people think the Constitution means?
For that matter what do the people think the Constitution is?5 7 Do

they think we have one written constitution or do they think we have
had three constitutional moments over the last 200 years? Do the
people think we have an unwritten constitution like England or do
they think that the text of 1787 as amended is somehow more
special?58
I think the people in this country still believe largely what they have
been learning in their high school civics classes for the last 200 years.
They think that we have a written constitution that has been amended
twenty-seven times, unlike the British who have an unwritten constitution that comprises important texts as part of their constitutional
tradition. The American people understand that constitutional commitments do grow over time and that there is open-ended language in
the text that may sometimes take on new meanings in modern con57. For a wonderful discussion, see Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of ConstitutionalNorms, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 45, 51-52 (1994)
(contrasting the legitimacy of a document he might draft that is labelled the Constitution with the legitimacy of the document that the people of the United States have for
200 years accepted as being the Constitution).

58. For several years now, I have been of the view that even if one defines law
only by reference to tradition and practice and not by reference to positive enactments one must still concede that in the United States it is our tradition and practice
to regard the text of the Constitution as a trump card-the touchstone of constitutionality in Justice Felix Frankfurter's words. For this reason, I have entitled this Response "The Tradition of the Written Constitution." I think it is our tradition in this
country to exalt the written Constitution. In this respect, we differ critically from the
British who have a more Ackermanian idea of tradition based constitutionalism punctuated by important evolutionary moments.
Professor Larry Solum has independently suggested the same point in conversation.
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texts. At the same time, they also think that the Constitution contains
some fairly specific rules that do not change over time. Thus, rules
about there being two senators from every state and the president
having to be thirty-five years of age do not seem to be permissible
subjects of constitutional evolution. In fact, the people are sure
enough of the meaning of many parts of the Constitution that litigation about those parts of the Constitution is unthinkable, and thus
never occurs. The holding of presidential and senatorial elections, the
running of the big institutions of government, matters of war and
peace, levels of spending and taxation-almost without exception
none of these things has ever been appreciably affected by litigation
or Supreme Court decisions.5 9
One thing that I think the people do understand is that the judicial
role is in some appreciable way different from the policy-making role
of the legislative and executive branches. 6° I think the fact that people
think this way helps to explain why it is that Supreme Court Justices
and other federal judges always try to justify their decisions by writing
opinions that appeal to the constitutional text, to history, and to prior
caselaw. Such appeals are what the Justices' employers-the American people-expect from their Court. They think this is the proper
way in which judges should go about interpreting and understanding
the Constitution.
On most important matters, the meaning of the constitutional text
has remained quite stable over time. And, constant efforts are made
to continue to use the inter-generational law-making machinery to entrench new rights in the Constitution, thus implying the belief that
constitutional entrenchment is a meaningful exercise and that newly
enacted constitutional law will in fact have some effect on future generations of Americans.
The Supreme Court gets out of line at times-on criminal law issues
or on the balance of national versus state power. When it does the
people yank it back, sometimes sharply as in 1937, sometimes more
gradually as has happened over the course of the last thirty years.
Great tragedies sometimes occur like the decisions in Plessy or Roe v.
Wade6 because the people elect Supreme Courts that fail to live up
the original constitutional commitments. Sometimes this is the fault
of the Justices leading us astray, but sometimes the fault must be said
to lie with the American people. We either elect courts that ratify
faulty constitutional principles, or we fail to correct egregious judicial
59. On other matters of constitutional interpretation, the differing party coalitions
do sometimes hold differing views: how active or restrained do we want our judges to
be on certain kinds of cases; is the Supreme Court too hostile to religion; too solidtous of the rights of criminal defendants; insufficiently vigorous in enforcing the Tenth
Amendment?
60. People may argue about how different these functions are, but I think almost
everyone agrees that at least some differences exist.
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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errors pointed out to us by our fellow citizens. Unfortunately, the
American people make mistakes too. Sometimes for sustained periods of time we fall into practices that are seriously wrong-that violate the very rules that in our better moments we chose to entrench
and constitutionalize. We knowingly elect Justices who do not follow
through on constitutional commitments of great importance.
Do these tragedies signify that the meaning of the "great texts" has
actually changed or been translated to incorporate corruption or that
constitutional government is impossible or that We the People would
never have gotten into at least some of these messes if we did not have
a Supreme Court to lead us astray? Absolutely not. The fault in these
instances lies only with ourselves because there are limits on what any
constitution can do to save and restrain those who are determined not
to live up to the entrenched and fundamental commitments they have
made.
Fortunately, under our system there is constant pressure to revisit
and correct mistakes when We make them. This is because our constitutional commitments are made in writing and because we are deeply
attached to them as a people and because our Justices can write their
decisions only by referring to those great written commitments which
are palpably inconsistent with decisions such as Dred Scott, and
Plessy, and Lochner, and Buck v. Bell, and Korematsu, and Roe.
When we fail to live up to our highest aspirations as stated in the
Founding Texts it is not because the meaning of those texts has been
translated but because it is part of the human condition not to always
live up to one's highest aspirations as to what is right. And usually,
the very existence of the texts serves as a reproach to us from our
ancestors: a constant reminder to us as a people and to the Justices
and lawyers who are always working with the texts that something is
not quite right. That some social practice or other has been allowed to
grow up is really a corruption in need of extirpation.
My conclusion, then, is that changed judicial and social readings of
the Constitution are not always correct interpretations of the document and that changing social background and context is relatively
unimportant in explaining the major themes of our Constitution. I
agree that the Founding Texts are always being applied to new circumstances but deny that this amounts to anything as wrenching as a
"translation" of those texts. Ultimately, the Constitution is interpreted by the People who mostly do a pretty good job on the important things. Lots of little mistakes get made around the edges and
constant vigilance is required to minimize and gradually erase them.
Sometimes big mistakes are made and the people are either to blame
or move too slowly in correcting them. The existence of our constitutional texts has been helpful, historically, in permitting all of us to
recognize and correct those mistakes by making it easier for us to repair to timeless principles.

